Failure Modes and Adversarial Robustness in Graph Fraud Detection
Graph Topology Attacks
Sophisticated fraudsters manipulate the graph structure itself. Creating fake edges to legitimate users dilutes suspicion by associating fraud accounts with clean neighborhoods. Deleting suspicious edges (using different devices, avoiding direct transfers) hides connections. Sybil attacks create many fake identities to overwhelm the graph with noise, making fraud rings harder to distinguish from normal user clusters.
Defense Principle: Defense requires layered signals. Graph structure alone is attackable. Combine with behavioral features (timing patterns, amount distributions) and device fingerprinting that are harder to fake at scale.
Embedding Drift
As the graph evolves, the embedding space drifts. Nodes that were similar a month ago may no longer be. Models trained on historical embeddings degrade as the live graph diverges. Monitor embedding distribution statistics (mean, variance, cluster centers) and retrain when drift exceeds thresholds.
Contamination During Training
If fraud labels are incomplete (many undetected fraud cases labeled as legitimate), the model learns that fraud patterns are normal. This is especially problematic for GNNs: a few mislabeled fraud nodes propagate clean signals through their neighborhoods, corrupting embeddings for connected legitimate users.
Warning: Label contamination propagates through graph structure. One mislabeled fraud ring can corrupt embeddings for all connected nodes, causing cascade of false negatives in the neighborhood.
Cold Start for New Nodes
New users and accounts have no graph history. The GNN produces generic embeddings based only on node features, missing the relational signals that make graph models powerful. Mitigation: use population-level baselines for new nodes, require minimum activity before graph-based scoring, or employ temporal attention that weighs recent connections more heavily.